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Abstract 
This paper investigates the Feldstein-Horioka coefficients and legal origins for 37 African countries using the recently 
developed panel cointegration techniques. The empirical findings reported in the paper reveal that savings and 
investment are nonstationary and cointegrated series. The estimated coefficients using DOLS is 0.58 for the sample as 
a whole for the period 1970-2006. However, there are marked differences in retentions ratios in each country group 
with ratio lowest in common law countries (0.34) compared to French civil law countries (0.85). These results imply 
that in the countries with strong legal protections of investors, capital tends to be mobile internationally than in 
countries with worse protection.
We are grateful to Patrick Villieu and Jean-Paul Pollin for helpful comments. 
Citation: Chrysost Bangaké and Jude Eggoh, (2010) ''International Capital Mobility in African Countries: Do the legal origins matter?'', 
Economics Bulletin, Vol. 30 no.1 pp. 73-83. 
Submitted: Nov 25 2009.   Published: January 06, 2010. 
 
       1 
1. Introduction 
 
The degree of international capital mobility determines the efficiency of capital allocation in 
the world economy. It is generally admitted that most of the African countries keep significant 
legal restrictions over capital movements and have limited financial market linkages with 
world economy. Such a situation has contributed to weak economic growth, a relatively low 
saving  rate  and  capital  flight  from  the  region  (Collier  and  Gunning,  1999).  Therefore, 
understanding the extent to which domestic saving finances domestic investment in Africa is 
an important aspect for economic policy makers and firms. 
 
There are several ways to investigate the degree of international capital mobility
1. One test 
proposed by Feldstein and Horioka (1980, hereafter FH) for capital mobility is to examine the 
relationship between saving and investment. According to these authors, in the absence of 
capital mobility, domestic saving and investment are highly correlated since investment is 
financed by domestic saving.   Since the work of FH, many economists have studied the 
relationship between savings and investment
2. 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between the saving -investment taking into account 
legal origins in African countries. In the last decade, economists have produced a considerable 
body of research suggesting a strong link between finance and law. The idea is that a variety 
of  legal  rules  (e.g.,  those  governing  both  investor  protection  and  legal  procedure)  can 
influence the protection of outside inve stors and hence financial markets. For example, La 
Porta and al. (1998) show that English common law countries have generally the strongest 
legal  protections  of  investors  while  the  civil  law  countries  the  weakest.  Shleifer  and 
Wolfenzon (2002) show that in countries with better investor protection, a larger fraction of 
the invested capital comes from the external market and a small fraction from internal funds 
(the funds of the entrepreneurs setting up).  Subsequent research showed that the influence of 
legal origins on law and regulations is not restricted to finance (see Djankov et  al. 2003, for 
example). Unfortunately, there has  only been one paper that has  examined the Feldstein-
Horioka  puzzle  and  legal  origins.  Gunji  (2003)  introduces  a  proxy  of  legal  protection  of 
investors, a dummy variable that indicate legal origins, into the Feldstein Horioka saving-
investment  regression  for  a  sample  of  20  OECD  countries  in  1970-2000.  The  estimation 
shows that the French-civil-law countries, which have the weakest investor protection, the 
domestic investment rates are generally less strongly correlated with the domestic saving rates.  
 
Although the Gunji’s study is interesting, it focuses however on cross section data. Saving 
and investment  rates usually turn out  to  be nonstationary.  In the unit-root literature, it is 
argued  that  the  widespread  failure  of  hypothesis  testing  in  relatively  short  series  may  be 
accounted for by the low power of conventional univariate unit root tests against persistent 
alternatives,  typically  for  sample  sizes  that  occur  in  practice.  Further,  the  traditional 
cointegration  technique  has  also  the  problem  of  low  power.  In  order  to  deal  with  these 
problems,  we  use  recently  developed  panel  cointegration  technique  and  dynamic  OLS 
(hereafter  DOLS)  methods  in  order  to  deal  with  heterogeneity  problems  and  to  conduct 
plausible  tests.  To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  this  is  the  first  paper  on  FH  using  panel 
cointegration and legal origins in African context. 
                                                 
1 The presence of capital mobility is tested alternatively by using the saving correlation, uncovered interest 
parity condition, and finally the consumption smoothing approach to the current account. See Obstfeld (1993) for 
more detail.  
2 See Coakley and al. (1998) for a survey.   2 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the empirical methodology. 
The data and empirical results are presented and interpreted in section 3. Section 4 makes 
some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Empirical methodology 
 
Following Feldstein and Horioka (1980) we propose assessing the degree of capital mobility 


































 are respectively the saving and investment rates of countryi ,   is the 
savings-retention  coefficient  and  i   is  the  error  term.  For  a  small,  open  economy  where 
capital is perfectly mobile internationally,   should be close to zero. If equals zero,   then 
there is no relationship between saving and investment. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) suppose 
that if   is large, however, capital is considered immobile internationally. For example, if   
equals one, then all additional saving goes to finance domestic investment. 
 
Most  writers  identify  two  main  secular  legal  traditions:  common  law  and  civil  law,  and 
several sub-traditions- French, German, socialist and Scandinavian (see Laporta et al. 2008). 
In this study the commercial law is classified into two origins: Common law and French civil 
law because of our sample. 
 
Following Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), our main hypothesis is that capital is relatively 
mobile  in  countries  with  stronger  protection  whereas  in  countries  with  worse  protection 
domestic investment rates and domestic saving rates are strongly associated. 
 
Our methodology departs from Gunji (2003). We make use of the new development in panel 
unit root tests and cointegration techniques to investigate the relationship between savings and 
investment in African countries for the period 1970-2006. We then break up our sample into 
French civil  law and common law countries and examine whether, the saving  ratio have 
change over time.  
 
 
2.1 Panel unit root tests 
 
Before  proceeding  to  cointegration  techniques,  we  need  to  verify  that  all  variables  are 
integrated to the same order. In doing so, we have used first generation tests of panel unit root 
due to Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) and Maddala and Wu (1999)
3 and second generation test 
of panel unit root of Pesaran (2005). These tests are less restrictive and more powerful 
compared to the tests developed by Levin and Lin (1993, 2002)
4, which don’t  allow for 
heterogeneity in the autoregressive coefficient. The tests proposed by IPS permit to solve 
Levin  and  Lin’s serial  correlation problem by  assuming heterogeneity  between units  in  a 
                                                 
3 Henceforth, IPS for Im, Pesaran and Shin, and MW for Maddala and Wu. 
4 For a useful survey on panel unit root tests, see Hurlin and Mignon (2005) and Banerjee (1999).   3 
dynamic  panel  framework.  The  basic  equation  for  the  panel  unit  root  tests  for  IPS  is  as 
follows: 
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where  t i y ,  stands for each variable under consideration in our model,  i   is  the  individual 
fixed  effect  and  p  is  selected  to  make  the  residuals  uncorrelated  over  time.  The  null 
hypothesis is that  0  i   for all i versus the alternative hypothesis is that  0  i   for some 
1 ,..., 1 N i   and  0  i   for N N i ,..., 1 1   . 
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where  iT t  is the ADF t-statistic for country i based on the country-specific ADF regression, as 
in Eq (1). IPS show that under the null hypothesis of non stationary, the t statistic follows the 






























.                     (4) 
Maddala  and  Wu  (1999)  argue  that  while  Im  et  al.’s  tests  relax  the  assumption  of 
homogeneity of the root across the units, several difficulties still remain. They suggest the use 
of a Fisher type test which is based on combining the p-values,  i   of the test-statistic for a 








                          (5) 
The  MW  test  statistic  is  distributed  as  Chi  square  with  2N degrees of freedom under the 
hypothesis of cross-sectional independence. 
 
According to Breitung (1999), IPS’s test is not powerful when individual trends are included. 
This test is sensitive to the specification of deterministic trends compared to IPS’s test. The 
MW test has the advantage that its value does not depend on different lag lengths in the 
individual ADF regressions. Furthermore, Maddala and Wu (1999) found that MW’s test is 
superior compared to IPS’s test. 
 
Both  the  tests  (IPS  and  MW)  have  the  drawback  to  suppose  that  the  cross-sections  are 
independent; the same assumption is made in all first generation of panel unit root. However, 
it has been pointed out in the literature that cross section dependence arises due to unobserved 
common  factors,  externalities,  regional  and  macroeconomic  linkages,  and  unaccounted 
residual interdependence. Recently, some new panel unit root tests have emerged and address 
the  question  of  the  dependence  and  correlation  given  the  prevalence  of  macroeconomic 
dynamics and linkages. These tests are called the second generation panel unit root tests. The 
well-known second generation test that is considered in this paper is the Pesaran’s CIPS test 
(2005). In order to formulate a panel unit root test with cross-sectional dependence, Pesaran 
(2005) considers the following Cross-Sectional Augmented Dickey-Fuller (CADF) regression, 
estimated the OLS method for the 
th i cross-section in the panel:   4 
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  , and    , i t N T  is the t-statistic of the estimate of 
i   in the above equation used for computing the individual ADF statistics. More preciously, 
Pesaran proposed the following test CIPS statistic that is based on the average of individual 
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  .                       (7) 
The critical values for CIPS for various deterministic terms are tabulated by Pesaran (2005). 
 
2.2 Panel cointegration tests 
 
Once the order of stationary has been defined, we would apply Predroni’s cointegration test 
methodology.  Indeed, like the  IPS and MW panel  unit root, the panel  cointegration tests 
proposed by Pedroni (1999) also take in account heterogeneity by using specific parameters 
which are allowed to vary across individual members of the sample. Taking into account such 
heterogeneity constitutes an advantage because it is unrealistic to assume that the vectors of 
cointegration are identical from an individual to another for the panel. 
 
The implementation of Pedroni’s cointegration test requires estimating first the following long 
run relationship: 
it it M Mi it i it i i i it x x x t y              , , 2 2 , 1 1 ...                 (8) 
for  N i ,..., 1   ;  T t ,..., 1  ;  M m ,..., 1   
where N refers to the numbers of individual members in the panel; T refers to the number of 
observation  over  time;  M  refers  to  the  number  of  exogenous  variables.  The  structure  of 
estimated residuals is follows:  
. ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 it it i it u                                 (9) 
 
Pedroni has proposed seven different statistics to test panel data cointegration. Out of these 
seven statistics, four are based on pooling, what is referred to as the “Within” dimension and 
the last three are based on the “Between” dimension. Both kinds of tests focus on the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration. However the distinction comes from the specification of the 
alternative  hypothesis.  For  the  tests  based  on  “Within”,  the  alternative  hypothesis  is 
1    i  for  all  i,  while  concerning  the  last  three  test  statistics  which  are  based  on  the 
“Between” dimension, the alternative hypothesis is  1  i  , for all i. 
The finite sample distribution for the seven statistics has been tabulated by Pedroni via Monte 
Carlo simulations. The calculated statistic tests must be smaller than the tabulated critical 
value to reject the null hypothesis of absence of cointegration. 
 
2.3 Panel cointegration estimation 
 
Although Pedroni’s methodology allows us to test the presence of cointegration, it could not 
provide estimation of long-run relationship. For panel framework, in presence of cointegration,   5 
several estimators are proposed: OLS, Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS)
5, and dynamic OLS 
(DOLS).  
 
In this paper, we use the dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) developed by Kao and 
Chiang (2001) to estimate the long-run vector between saving and investment. This estimator 
is  designed  for  non  stationary  panels  and  corrects  the  standard  pooled  OLS  for  serial 
correlation and endogeneity of regressors that are normally present in long run economic 
relationships. Furthermore, Kao and Chiang (2001) showed that bo th the OLS and FMOLS 
exhibit small sample bias and the DOLS estimator appears to outperform both estimators. 
 
The DOLS is an extension of Stock and Watson’s (1993) estimator. In order to obtain an 
unbiased estimator of the long-run parameters, DOLS estimator uses parametric adjustment to 
the errors by including the past and the future values of the differenced I(1) regressors. The 
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where  ij c  is the coefficient of a lead or lag of first differenced explanatory variables. The 
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where  ,, , ,..., it it i i t q i t q z x x x x         is    2 1 1 q  vector of regressors. 
 
 




The data are taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI, 2008) CD-ROM for 37 
African countries for the period 1970-2006. Following the original study of Feldstein and 
Horioka,  savings  is  defined  as  gross  domestic  savings  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  while 
investment  is  measured  by  gross  fixed  capital  formation  divided  by  GDP
6.  The data are 
summarised in table 1 (in appendix) which shows marked differences between savings and 
investment ratios within and across countries.  
 
3.2. The unit root tests 
 
Table 2 reports the outcome for the global sample of three panel unit root tests: IPS (2003), 
MW (1999) and Pesaran (2003). It shows that the null hypothesis of the unit roots for the 
panel data for the investment and savings series cannot be rejected in level. However, this 
hypothesis is rejected when series are in first differences. These results strongly indicate that 
the variables in level are non-stationary and stationary in first-differences. The same issues 
                                                 
5 The FMOLS is popular in conve ntional time series econometrics, for it is believed to 
eliminate endogeneity in the regressors and serial correlation in the errors. 
6 Bayoumi (1990) and Sinha and Sinha (2004) suggest the use of gross fixed capital formation, 
since it excludes the procyclical inventories component that may lead to spurious correlations 
with savings.   6 
are obtained for the panels of country groups: civil law and common law countries (table 3) 
Therefore, we can implement a test for panel cointegration between savings and investment. 
 
Table 2: Panel unit root for saving and investment ratios, 1970-2006 (global sample) 
    Im et al. (2003)    Maddala and Wu (1999)    Pesaran (2005) 
    Statistic  P-values    Statistic  P-values    Statistic  P-values 
All countries (37)               
  /
it IY     -1.547  0.148    59.477  0.890    -1.421  0.988 
  /
it IY      -4.026  0.000    488.481  0.000    -3.913  0.000 
  /
it SY     -1.384  0.489    63.166  0.811    -1.599  0.866 
  /
it SY      -4.149  0.000    544.287  0.000    -3.766  0.000 
 
Table  3:  Panel  unit  root  for  saving  and  investment  ratios,  1970-2006  (civil  law  vs 
common law countries) 
    Im et al. (2003)    Maddala and Wu (1999)    Pesaran (2005) 
    Statistic  P-values    Statistic  P-values    Statistic  P-values 
Civil law countries                
  /
it IY     -1.480  0.322    35.583  0.669    -1.610  0.776 
  /
it IY      -4.052  0.000    273.646  0.000    -3.948  0.000 
  /
it SY     -1.244  0.735    24.456  0.974    -1.434  0.945 
  /
it SY      -4.300  0.000    320.241  0.000    -3.904  0.000 
Common law countries              
  /
it IY     -1.671  0.115    19.893  0.953    -1.279  0.982 
  /
it IY      -3.876  0.000    191.575  0.000    -3.871  0.000 
  /
it SY     -1.509  0.297    29.348  0.601    -1.081  0.998 
  /
it SY      -3.986  0.000    211.272  0.000    -3.792  0.000 
 
3.3. Panel cointegration tests 
 
Table 4 shows the outcomes of Pedroni’s (1999) cointegration tests between the investment 
and savings rates. We use four within-group tests and three between-group tests to check 
whether the panel data are cointegrated. The columns labeled within-dimension contain the 
computed value of the statistics based on estimators that pool the autoregressive coefficient 
across  different  countries  for  the  unit  root  tests  on  the  estimated  residuals.  The  columns 
labeled between-dimension report the computed value of the statistics based on estimators 
that average individually estimated coefficients for each country. Except the v-statistic test, 
the results of the within-group test and the between-group tests show that the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration can not be rejected at the 1% significant level. Therefore, the ratios of 
saving and investment are cointegrated for the panel of all countries and for the panels of 
country groups (common law and civil law countries) 
 
The presence of a long-run relationship between investment and saving rate in the panel of 
African countries are economically meaningful in that it suggests that these countries meet the 
long-run solvency condition. Having found that there exists a cointegrating link between the 
two variables (ratios of saving and investment), it is convenient that the savings-retention   7 
coefficient be estimated using a panel cointegrating estimator. In this paper, we choose to 
employ the Dynamic OLS (DOLS).  
 
Table 4:  Pedroni Panel cointegration test results, 1970-2006 
  Within-dimension (panel)      Between-dimension (group) 
  v-Stat   -Stat  PP-Stat  ADF-Stat     -Stat  PP-Stat  ADF-Stat 
All  0.538  -4.836
***  -6.282
***  -7.282












English  -0.533  -0.875  -1.375
*  -1.731
***    -0.415  -1.995
**  -2.729
*** 
Notes:  Results  with  a  trend  and  time-dummies.  The  test  statistics  are  normalized  so  that  the  asymptotic 
distribution is standard normal. 
*, 
**, 
*** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of non cointegration at the 10, 5, 
and 1 percent significance levels, based respectively on critical values of 1.281, 1.644 and 2.326. 
 
3.4. Panel cointegration estimations 
 
We estimate the cointegrating vector using panel DOLS method. The estimates results by 
period are reported in table 5. First, for the pool of all countries the FH coefficient for the full 
sample period (1970-2006) is  0.58 and broadly consistent  with  the work by Adedeji and 
Thornton  (2006)  which  report  a  savings-retention  coefficient  of  0.51  for  DOLS  estimate. 
However, our result contrast with those of De Wet and Van Eyden (2005) which report a 
savings retention coefficient small (0.31, 0.34 and 0.28) respectively for Pooled, fixed effects 
and random effects models. Furthermore, we show that the FH coefficients declines over the 
sample period. Indeed, the FH coefficient is 0.62 for the period 1970-1987, whereas it is 0.52 
in  the second sub-period (1988-2006) implying that capital  mobility increased in  African 
countries over time. 
 
There are striking results when considering panels of country groups according to their legal 
origins (French civil law versus common law countries). There are marked differences in 
retentions ratios between country groups. The estimates for French civil law countries indicate 
a saving retention coefficient relatively high, 0.85 compared to common law countries with 
0.34 for the entire period (1970-2006). When we consider two sub-periods (1970-1987 and 
1988-2006), the FH coefficient declines in French civil law countries but remains relatively 
high (from 0.98 to 0.70), while in common law countries the FH coefficient is broadly same 
about 0.30. These results indicate that capital has been relatively mobile internationally in 
common  law  countries  while  in  civil  law  countries  the  FH  puzzle  is  held  although  the 
coefficient declines over period. Our interpretation of the FH coefficient is different of Gunji 
(2003) because he takes into account a dummy variable, while our analysis centres directly on 
the coefficient of .   
 
What do the marked differences in retentions ratios between country groups (common law 
countries versus French civil law countries) means? According to La Porta and al. (1998), 
English common law countries have generally  the strongest legal protections of investors 
while  the  civil  law  countries  the  weakest.  Shleifer  and  Wolfenzon  (2002)  show  that  in 
countries with better investor protection, a larger fraction of the invested capital comes from 
the external market and a small fraction from internal funds (the funds of the entrepreneurs 
setting up). This fact combined to less formalism of judicial procedures and many reforms 
undertaken early 1980 in common law countries (privatization, rationalization of their publics 
sector,  liberalization  of  exchange  rate  and  financial  systems)  have  contributed  to  relative 
capital mobility. 
   8 
Table 5 : Panel cointegration vector: DOLS results 
Countries    Period    Saving-retention ratio    t-ratio 
All    1970-2006    0.582
***    12.29 
    1970-1987    0.620
***    7.43 
    1988-2006    0.526
***    7.48 
Common law    1970-2006    0.343
***    3.92 
    1970-1987    0.283
**    2.25 
    1988-2006    0.335
***    2.70 
French Civil law    1970-2006    0.859
***    30.48 
    1970-1987    0.982
***    27.77 
    1988-2006    0.708
***    19.12 
Notes: the value in parenthesis denotes the t-value for zero coefficients. 
*** significant at 1% and 
** significant at 
5%. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper has studied the international capital mobility of 37 African countries in terms of 
the FH coefficient and legal origins, applying recently developed panel cointegration methods. 
We apply panel cointegration test and used DOLS methods in order to deal with heterogeneity 
problems and to conduct plausible tests. 
 
The  empirical  findings  reported  in  the  paper  reveal  that  savings  and  investment  are 
nonstationary and cointegrated series. Capital was relatively mobile in the African countries 
in the sample during 1970-2006, with estimated saving retention coefficients of 0.58 for the 
pool of all countries. When we consider panels of country groups (French civil law countries 
versus  common  law  countries)  there  are  marked  differences  in  retentions  ratios  in  each 
country  group  with  ratio  lowest  in  common  law  countries  compared  to  French  civil  law 
countries. Our results show that capital tends to be mobile internationally in common law 
countries with strongest legal protection than in French civil law with the weakest. Some 
recent papers also suggest that in countries with better investor protection, a larger fraction of 
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A.  Legal origins (Source: Laporta et al., 2008) 
 
French civil law countries: Algeria, Benin, Burkina, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad,  Congo  Democratic  Republic,  Congo,  Côte  d’Ivoire,  Egypt,  Gabon,  Guinea-Bissau, 
Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia.  
 
Common  law  countries:  Botswana,  Burundi,  Gambia,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Lesotho,  Malawi, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe   10 
 
B. 
Table 1: Property of the data: descriptive statistics by country, 1970-2006 
Country    Investment rate    Saving rate 
  Mean  Std. Dev.    Mean  Std. Dev. 
All countries    19.212  9.128    11.160  17.213 
Algeria    30.439  6.527    35.008  8.490 
Benin    16.053  3.374    1.631  4.206 
Botswana    28.227  6.778    35.846  12.467 
Burkina    18.901  3.324    2.765  5.509 
Burundi    10.964  4.679    -2.019  7.563 
Cameroon    19.767  7.322    19.919  4.281 
Central African Rep.    11.346  3.707    2.259  4.631 
Chad    15.637  11.926    2.941  14.052 
Congo. Dem. Rep.    10.770  4.985    9.675  5.308 
Congo. Republic of    27.720  8.546    30.232  17.376 
Cote d’Ivoire    15.501  6.206    21.362  5.651 
Egypt    21.432  5.848    13.925  3.076 
Gabon    31.905  10.131    48.911  11.673 
Gambia    17.939  6.036    6.186  4.397 
Ghana    14.945  7.996    7.295  3.429 
Guinea-Bissau    23.953  9.399    -2.492  6.810 
Kenya    18.640  2.234    16.448  4.847 
Lesotho    38.663  15.527    -45.914  21.343 
Madagascar    12.368  4.578    4.975  3.721 
Malawi    17.966  5.281    9.037  6.711 
Mali    19.049  4.679    4.838  6.632 
Mauritania    21.932  13.424    2.713  14.470 
Morocco    22.813  4.335    17.591  4.065 
Niger    13.344  5.163    5.679  4.711 
Nigeria    20.538  4.773    24.307  8.808 
Rwanda    14.528  3.333    1.746  9.474 
Senegal    18.200  4.715    7.181  3.755 
Sierra Leone    10.100  3.502    6.749  10.386 
South Africa    20.833  4.979    24.290  5.642 
Sudan    13.545  3.920    8.485  5.087 
Swaziland    22.527  7.106    11.902  14.325 
Tanzania    16.832  5.439    4.432  4.193 
Togo    19.261  4.433    13.136  11.725 
Tunisia    25.569  3.854    22.731  2.154 
Uganda    13.014  5.220    5.839  4.461 
Zambia    18.386  8.109    17.776  12.486 
Zimbabwe    17.246  3.545    15.559  5.721 
 
 
 